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Abstract
The States’ perception of what constitutes fair competition in inter-
national air transport has evolved from a quid pro quo approach in the era
of airline regulation to a laissez-faire approach in the era of airline
de-regulation. However, no consensus has ever been reached as to, first,
what constitutes fair competition in an industry whose market access is
still contingent on bilateral air services agreements (ASAs), and, second,
what the pre-requisites of a level playing field are. The commercial
success of the Gulf airlines has obliged regulators and policymakers
around the world to revisit this issue and demand compliance with global
rules. The EU has responded by adopting Regulation (EU) 2019/712 on
safeguarding fair competition, as well as by championing the inclusion of
fair competition clauses inASAs. The analysis examines the compatibility
of unilateral action under the Regulation with mutually negotiated
solutions under ASAs so as to assess the legitimacy and efficiency of the
EU strategy in the area of fair competition in international air transport.
1. Introduction
The quest for fair competition in international air transport is as old as the
regulation of commercial aviation. The 1944 Chicago Convention, which is
often referred to as the Constitution of international civil aviation, refers to
“equality of opportunity” in international air transport services in its
Preamble.1 It further sets out the objectives of “efficient and economical air
transport”, “prevent[ing] economic waste caused by unreasonable
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1. “[T]he undersigned governments having agreed on certain principles and arrangements
in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that
international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity
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© 2020 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the United Kingdom.
competition” and “a fair opportunity to operate international airlines”.2 When
the Chicago Convention was drafted, i.e. during the last days of World War II,
equality of opportunity and fair competition referred more to the right of
sovereign States to participate in the provision of air services on an equal basis
with other States. Such a right legitimized the adoption of restrictive domestic
regulation, whereby the operation of international air services over or into a
State’s territory was (and, as a matter of fact, remains) subject to that State’s
special permission and terms.3 Moreover, it legitimized States to subsidize
their national (usually publicly-owned) air carriers.
Today, fair competition in international air transport has a very different
meaning. The economic regulation of the sector has evolved since the Chicago
Convention from a restrictive regime, whereby all aspects of air services were
agreed between or approved by national governments, to a more liberal
regime, whereby air carriers enjoy considerable freedom in the provision of air
services. Despite this regulatory progress, international air transport has not
been liberalized multilaterally. Instead, the liberalization is piecemeal and has
been achieved bilaterally by means of air services agreements (ASAs)
concluded between States, colloquially known as open skies agreements.
Such agreements ease restrictions with respect to market access, capacity,
frequency, pricing and other aspects of air services. As a result, States lack a
common understanding of fair competition. If one accepts that fair
competition can only be exercised on a level playing field, States also seem to
disagree on the latter. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
has stated that “there is currently no commonly accepted definition of the
conditions constituting a level playing field” and “it is unlikely that consensus
on a comprehensive definition can be achieved at this time, given the widely
different circumstances of States and their aviation sectors…”.4
and operated soundly and economically”. Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened
for signature 7 Dec. 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (entered into force 7 Apr. 1947).
2. Ibid., Art. 44(d), (e) and (f) of the Chicago Convention provide: “The aims and objectives
of the [International Civil Aviation] Organization are to develop the principles and techniques
of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development of international air
transport so as to: . . . (d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient
and economical air transport; (e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition;
(f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected and that every contracting State
has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines”.
3. Art. 6 of the Chicago Convention, entitled “Scheduled air services”, reads: “No
scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting
State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance
with the terms of such permission and authorization”.
4. ICAO Working Paper ATConf/6-WP/4 (Fair Competition in International Air Transport),
4 Dec. 2012.
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Nevertheless, the issue of fair competition in international air transport has
recently attracted significant attention. The growth of the Gulf airlines, itself
part of the rise of Asia as the focal point of global growth, has disturbed the
competitive balance in international air transport and triggered US and EU
airlines to complain about unfair competition and demand the levelling of the
playing field. As a result, a debate has been fuelled on the rules of the game in
international air transport, which has spread not only within the airline
industry, but also in regulatory bodies as well as academia.
The EU is an active (and often proactive) actor in the regulation of
international air transport. However, its policies have not always been
welcomed for their wisdom either by the international community or by the
EU airline industry. For example, the application of the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme to international aviation had to be suspended due to the reaction of the
international community, which condemned the EU’s initiative to afford
extraterritorial effect to its regional law.5 The suspension of the EU scheme
with respect to foreign airlines’ operations outside the EU left EU network
airlines at a disadvantage when competing internationally against
third-country airlines, whose home operations are not subject to similar
measures. In addition, the EU’s action in the area of consumer protection, and
in particular its initiative to regulate air passenger rights in the event of flight
delay,6 has been criticized for its incompatibility with international law, in
particular the 1929 Warsaw Convention7 and the 1999 Montreal Convention,8
which regulate delay.9 At the other end of the spectrum, EU action in the area
of aircraft emissions was what really catalysed action within the ICAO at a
moment of defiance and stagnation, culminating in a global scheme for
international aviation, namely the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme
for International Aviation (CORSIA).10 Equally, the regulation of air
5. Decision 377/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2013
derogating temporarily from Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading within the Community, O.J. 2013, L 113/1.
6. Regulation (EC) 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 Feb. 2004
establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied
boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) 295/91,
O.J. 2004, L 46/1.
7. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, opened for signature 12 Oct. 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, 49 Stat. 3000 (entered into force 13
Feb. 1933).
8. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage byAir, opened
for signature 28 May 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350 (entered into force 4 Nov. 2003).
9. Arnold and Mendes de Leon, “Regulation (EC) 261/2004 in the light of the recent
decisions of the European Court of Justice: Time for a change?!”, 35 Air & Space Law (2010),
91–112.
10. Assembly Resolution A39-3: Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and
practices related to environmental protection – Global Market-based Measure (MBM) scheme,
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passenger rights by the EU seems to have inspired foreign jurisdictions, which
are adopting similar laws, at times modelled on the EU provisions.11
This paper examines the EU’s response to the calls for fair competition in
international air transport by focusing on two recent EU policies, specifically
Regulation 2019/712 on safeguarding fair competition12 and the inclusion of
fair competition clauses in ASAs with third States, negotiated either by the
Member States or by the EU itself on behalf of the Member States.
Considering that Regulation 2019/712 is a unilateral measure that governs
issues covered under the ASAs, the interplay between supranational law and
international law and, in particular, the potential of supranational law to
influence international law in the area of air transport, will be considered with
a view to determining the efficiency of the EU policies.
Section 2 which follows sets the stage for the debate. Section 3 critically
examines Regulation 2019/712, as well as the operation of fair competition
clauses in ASAs to determine whether they are synergistic or mutually
conflicting. Section 4 attempts an assessment of the efficiency of EU policies
in the area of air transport. Section 5 concludes the analysis.
2. Background to the debate regarding fair competition in
international air transport
The economic regulation of international air transport is not an issue that has
been agreed upon by sovereign States and regulated multilaterally by means of
an international agreement, nor is it an issue that the ICAO has authorization
to regulate. Thus, the Chicago Convention does not regulate market access in
air transport. However, during the negotiations for its adoption, the States
devised a mechanism to exchange traffic rights, based on a number of
“freedoms of the air”, which they defined in two ancillary international
agreements, namely the International Air Services Transit Agreement
(IASTA)13 and the International Air Transport Agreement (IATA)14. IASTA
at <www.icao.int/environmental-protection/CORSIA/Documents/Resolution_A39_3.pdf> (all
websites last visited 28 March 2020).
11. Correia and Rouissi, “Global, regional and national air passenger rights – Does the
patchwork work?”, 40 Air & Space Law (2015), 123–146.
12. Regulation (EU) 2019/712 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2019 on safeguarding competition in air transport, and repealing Regulation (EC) 868/2004,
O.J. 2019, L 123/4.
13. International Air Services Transit Agreement (IASTA), opened for signature 7 Dec.
1944, 59
Stat. 1693, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
14. International Air Transport Agreement, opened for signature 7 Dec. 1944, 59 Stat.
1701, 171 U.N.T.S. 387.
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regulates the first two freedoms of the air, which are technical in nature,
namely the right to overfly foreign countries without landing and the right to
land in foreign countries for non-traffic purposes (e.g. refuelling or aircraft
maintenance). IATA regulates the core commercial freedoms, namely, the
right to fly from an airline’s home country to a foreign country (third freedom)
and back (fourth freedom), as well as the right of an airline, on a route that
either originates in or is destined for its home country, to carry traffic between
two foreign countries (fifth freedom).15 Unlike IASTA, which counts 133
signatories, IATA has attracted only 11 signatories. The reluctance of States to
sign IATA and exchange traffic rights multilaterally resulted in bilateral
ASAs. Depending on the bilateral partners’ aeropolitical relations, the degree
of market access achieved by such agreements varies and ranges from basic
connectivity (third and fourth freedom rights) in restrictive ASAs to cabotage
rights (eighth and ninth freedom rights) in liberal ASAs.16
Bilateral ASAs, which today are estimated at around 4,000,17 started off
being restrictive and their underlying philosophy was equality of outcome
rather than equality of opportunity. In traditional ASAs, each party had the
right to designate only one airline to operate the agreed services, usually the
national flag carrier; traffic rights were exchanged on a quid pro quo basis;
capacity was predetermined and even though it was tied to demand, the total
capacity was shared equally between the parties and not proportionately to the
size of each individual market;18 pricing was subject to the approval of both
15. E.g. the right of KLM to depart from Amsterdam Schiphol, land at New York JFK,
deplane some passengers and cargo and enplane new passengers and cargo there and continue
to Mexico City International Airport, or the right of SAS to depart from Toronto Pearson
Airport, land at Chicago O’Hare International Airport, discharge some traffic and cargo and
take on new traffic and cargo there and take off for the final destination in the air carrier’s home
country, e.g. Stockholm Arlanda Airport.
16. See definition of nine freedoms of the air on the website of the ICAO, extracted from the
Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport (Doc 9626, Part 4), at <www.icao.int
/Pages/freedomsAir.aspx>.
17. See WTO’s Quantitative Air Services Agreements Review (QUASAR), Part Two, Part
A, Introduction to QUASAR, S/C/W/270/Add. 1, I.9. et seq., at <www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/serv_e/transport_e/quasar_ parta_e.pdf>.
18. A typical clause in a traditional ASA regulating capacity would provide: “Each Party
shall allow fair and equal opportunity for the designated airlines of both Parties to operate the
agreed services between their respective territories so as to achieve equality and mutual benefit,
in principle by equal sharing of the total capacity between the Parties”. See ICAO Document
9587, Policy and Guidance Material on the Economic Regulation of International Air
Transport, 3rd ed. 2008, Appendix 5 (ICAO Template Air Services Agreements), 21–22 (Art.
16), at <www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/Doc%209587_en.pdf>.
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governments;19 and, by and large, all facets of doing business were regulated
by national governments. Such economic protectionism prevailed in the years
following World War II due to the asymmetry between the thriving United
States airspace industry and the destroyed aerospace industries of other
countries, especially the United Kingdom, which was still a colonial power.
Shielding UK airlines from free market forces was critical in order to prevent
the monopolization of international air services by US airlines.
During the era of economic protectionism, the issue of fair competition in
international air transport was raised in the context of air carriers based in
countries with a small domestic market, which, however, were very active on
international routes, in particular the Dutch KLM, the Scandinavian SAS and
the Belgian (now defunct) Sabena. Back in 1961, the US complained about the
allegedly excessive “fifth freedom traffic” that those European airlines
carried to the US in violation of the capacity provisions in the relevant bilateral
ASAs. Pursuant to the American view, most of the capacity operated by these
airlines across the North Atlantic was not used for traffic between the US and
the home country of the carrier (referred to as “primary justification” or
“primary entitlement” traffic), but for traffic between the US and third States
via the home country of the carriers (referred to as “secondary justification”
traffic).20 This constituted a violation of the capacity provisions in ASAs,
which were based on the “understanding” that “the primary objective” of a
service was to provide “capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the
country of which such airline is a national and the country of ultimate
destination of the traffic”.21 Such a wording refers to the most frequently
exchanged and thus valuable commercial freedoms of the air, namely the third
and the fourth, which entitle an airline to carry traffic from its home country
to a foreign country (third freedom)22 and back (fourth freedom).23
The US qualification of traffic between the US and third States via the
home country of the aforementioned European carriers as “fifth freedom
traffic” was contested, especially by the Dutch and the Scandinavians, who
pointed to the fact that such traffic did not qualify as “fifth freedom traffic”,
but constituted a mere combination of the fourth and third freedom rights. As
19. A typical clause in a traditional ASA regulating pricing (tariffs) would provide for a
double approval system, whereby: “The tariffs to be charged by the designated airlines of the
Parties for carriage between their territories shall be subject to the approval of both Parties”,
ibid., at A4-25 (Art. 17(4)).
20. Lissitzyn, “Bilateral agreements on air transport”, 30 Journal of Air Law and
Commerce (1964), 248–263.
21. Ibid.
22. E.g. the right of British Airways to carry traffic from London Heathrow to Los Angeles
International Airport.
23. I.e. from Los Angeles to London Heathrow, see Lissitzyn op. cit. supra note 20.
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a result, no violation of the capacity formula in ASAs could be substantiated.
Even though the right of an air carrier to carry traffic from a third State to
another third State via its home country constitutes the sixth freedom of the
air,24 rather than the fifth freedom, as claimed by the US, under restrictive
ASAs the sixth freedom is not allowed, hence the US view of such traffic as
“fifth freedom traffic”.25 Broken down into its constituents, the sixth freedom
is a combination of the fourth and the third freedoms. This suggests that even
when sixth freedom rights have not been exchanged in air services
agreements, an airline can still mount such operations, using the fourth and
third freedom rights under two separate air services agreements.
Sixth freedom rights are dependent upon geography and are particularly
suited to long-haul, inter-continental operations. They enable airlines based in
countries with a small domestic market to participate in the provision of
international air services by operating a hub-and-spoke system. Traffic from
different (international) spokes is brought to the (national) hub and from there
is flown to various destinations. This is the model currently operated by the
Gulf airlines, Singapore Airlines, KLM and many others.26 The allegation that
sixth freedom rights amount to unfair competition in international air
transport is based on the idea that traffic between two countries belongs only
to these countries whose airlines are solely entitled to carry it. The question of
whether such operations, when performed on the basis of the fourth and third
freedom rights under two separate bilaterals, violate the relevant ASAs or
indeed any other legal basis remains controversial.27
In the 1970s, the inherent tension between economic protectionism and fair
competition became clearer. In 1974, the US adopted the International Air
Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act (IATFCPA) in response to
complaints from US airlines that they suffered discriminatory airport charges
24. E.g. the right of KLM to depart from New York JFK, make a stopover at Amsterdam
Schiphol to deplane some passengers and cargo and enplane new passengers and cargo – with
or without change of aircraft – and continue to its final destination at Dubai International
Airport.
25. As Henri Wassenbergh put it: “Under present traditional standard bilateralism, the
designated air carriers are not allowed to schedule and operate through-services with one
aircraft (or an agreed change of gauge) and one line number from points behind their home
country, via their home country to points in foreign countries and carry freely ‘sixth’ freedom
traffic on such through service. As a matter of fact such carriage then would involve ‘en route’
third country fifth freedom air traffic carriage”. See Wassenbergh, “The ‘sixth’ freedom
revisited”, 21 Air & Space Law (1996), 285–294.
26. For an analysis of the sixth freedom model, see de Wit, “Unlevel playing field? Ah yes,
you mean protectionism”, 41 Journal of Air Transport Management (2014), 22–29.
27. See analysis in Lykotrafiti, “Air transport and international economic law” in El
Boudouhi (Ed.), Les Transports Au Prisme du Droit International Public (Editions PEDONE,
2019), pp. 101–120.
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in certain countries.28 IATFCPA enabled the US government to implement
retaliatory charges against airlines established in such countries when
operating in the US. In 1976, the UK denounced its bilateral ASA with the US
and succeeded in negotiating a more restrictive version. The US diplomatic
defeat sparked the reaction of Congress and triggered the Carter
Administration to proclaim:
“The guiding principle of U.S. aviation negotiation policy will be to trade
competitive opportunities, rather than restrictions, with our negotiating
partners. We will aggressively pursue our interests in expanded air
transportation and reduced prices rather than accept the self-defeating
accommodation of protectionism. Our concessions in negotiations will be
given in return for progress toward competitive objectives, and these
concessions themselves will be of a liberalizing character.”29
In line with its new policy, the US began to renegotiate its ASAs, entering into
the first generation of open skies agreements, most notably with the
Netherlands in 1978.30 Moreover, it de-regulated the domestic air transport
market (1978) and expanded the scope of IATFCPA by adopting the
International Air Transportation Competition Act (IATCA), which addresses
“unjustifiable or unreasonable discriminatory, predatory, or anticompetitive
practices against a US air carrier” or “unjustifiable or unreasonable
restrictions on access of a US air carrier to foreign markets”.31 The Act
established a complaint procedure for US airlines to report cases of
discrimination or anticompetitive actions by foreign governments or airlines
and empowered the US Department of Transportation “without hearing, but
subject to the approval of the President of the United States, [to] summarily
suspend the permits of the foreign air carriers of such country, or alter, modify,
amend, condition, or limit operations under such permits” and even “restrict
operations between such foreign country and the United States by any foreign
air carrier of a third country”.32 In practice, the US has refrained from
exercising such sweeping powers, following instead the route of
28. The International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974, Pub. L.
98–443, 98 Stat. 1706 (signed into law on 3 Jan. 1975).
29. United States Policy for the Conduct of International Air Transportation Negotiations,
Statement of 21 Aug. 1978 (undocketed).
30. Mendes de Leon, “Before and after the tenth anniversary of the Open Skies Agreement
Netherlands-US of 1992”, 27 Air & Space Law (2002), 280–314.
31. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1159(b)(1) (1980) (recodified as 49 U.S.C.A. § 41310 (West 2008)).
32. Ibid.
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intergovernmental negotiations and amicable resolution of disputes (see
below, section 4).33
On the other side of the Atlantic, the debate on fair competition in
international air transport followed a more esoteric route and was linked to the
objective of establishing a single aviation market. EU air liberalization
exposed the problem of illegal State aid. One of the key reasons why
liberalization was phased in progressively over a period of ten years
(1987–1997) was to enable the heavily subsidized national flag carriers to
restructure their operations and return to profitability before competing on a
level playing field. EU national flag carriers competed internationally against
airlines – especially US airlines – that had been privately owned since the very
early days of commercial aviation. Given that illegal subsidies distort
competition, one would have expected the US airlines to have complained
vehemently about the State-owned EU airlines, which were constantly in the
red and being bailed out by their governments. However, until the launch of the
US open skies policy in 1992, illegal subsidies were more of an issue
domestically than internationally, partly due to the fact that US airlines had
long benefited from US government-financed traffic and other privileges (e.g.
Air Mail Act of 1930,34 Fly America Act,35 and Civil Reserve Air Fleet
program36).
The opening up of the national markets to competition paved the way for
liberalization in international air transport. The US pioneered open skies and
launched its eponymous policy in 1992, founded on the idea of multiple airline
designations, unrestricted capacity and frequencies, unrestricted route and
traffic rights, and free market pricing.37 The US open skies were “designed to
liberalize, to the maximum extent, the aviation markets between and beyond
the US and Europe” and aspired to establish open-skies relationships with
other regions of the world.38 Fair competition in international air transport
naturally obtained a new meaning, which was reflected in the wording itself of
33. For a critical discussion of IATCPA, see Havel, Beyond Open Skies –A New Regime for
International Aviation, (Kluwer, 2009), ch. 4 III.
34. Nyrop, “The question of U.S. air mail subsidy”, 18 Journal of Air Law & Commerce
(1951), 409–420.
35. Visit:<www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/travel-management-policy/fly-america
-act>.
36. Visit: <www.transportation.gov/mission/administrations/intelligence-security-emerge
ncy-response/civil-reserve-airfleet-allocations>.
37. See Final Order of the US Department ofTransportation in the matter of defining “Open
Skies”, Order 92-8-13, Docket 48130, 5 Aug. 1992.
38. Ibid.
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ASAs, which no longer referred to “a fair opportunity to operate”,39 but to “a
fair and equal opportunity to compete”.40
In the aftermath of domestic air transport liberalization, State aid control in
Europe tightened. Privatization of national flag carriers became part of, or the
outcome of airline restructuring, a process supervised by the European
Commission. At the same time, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 inflated the cost of
purchasing private “war risk” insurance, a condition necessary for airline
operation. In response, the US passed legislation so as to offer the US airlines
war risk insurance on terms agreed upon prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.41
Furthermore, the closure of the US airspace for four days resulted in
significant operating losses for US airlines, which were addressed by means of
cash injections and loan guarantees.42 Unlike the European Commission,
which rendered it clear to the EU airlines that State aid could only be
authorized for the loss of traffic during the period of US airspace closure,43 the
US government extended its support to US airlines for loss of traffic beyond
that period. The asymmetry in the EU and US approaches triggered a reaction
from the European Commission, which, worried that the US package of
measures “could have an effect on markets where American and European
airlines are in intense competition, i.e. primarily the transatlantic routes”,44
adopted draft legislation to tackle subsidies and unfair pricing practices by
third-country airlines (see below, section 3).45
By 2007, when the US-EU Air Transport Agreement was signed, the
European Commission had gained significant clout in international air
39. Traditional bilaterals provide: “[E]ach designated airline shall have a fair opportunity to
operate the routes specified in the Agreement”, see ICAO Document 9587, Appendix 5 (ICAO
Template Air Services Agreements), 21 (Art. 15), cited supra note 18.
40. Art. 11(1), entitled “Fair Competition”, of the US Model Open Skies Agreement
provides: “each designated airline shall have a fair and equal opportunity to compete in
providing the international air transportation governed by the agreement”. See Air Transport
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
[Country], 12 Jan. 2012, at <www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/114866.htm>.
41. Elias, “Aviation War Risk Insurance: Background and Options for Congress”,
Congressional Research Service 7-5700, R43715, 5 Sept. 2015, at <fas.org/sgp/crs/misc
/R43715.pdf>.
42. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Public Law 107–42, 22 Sept.
2001, at <www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ42/PLAW-107publ42.pdf>.
43. Commission Communication, The repercussions of the terrorist attacks in the United
States on the air transport industry, COM (2001)574 final, 10 Oct. 2001, at 5.1.
44. Ibid., at 1, para 4.
45. Proposal for a Regulation concerning protection against subsidization and unfair
pricing practices in the supply of airline services from countries not members of the European
Community, COM(2002)110 final, 12 March 2002. For an analysis of the interplay between
9/11 and EU legislative action, see McGonigle, “Past its use-by date: Regulation 868
concerning subsidy and State aid in international air services”, 38 Air & Space Law (2013),
1–20.
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transport.46 In the seminal 2002 open skies judgments, the European Court of
Justice delineated the respective competences of Member States and the EU in
external aviation relations.47 In particular, the Court clarified that even though
the EU does not have exclusive external competence to conclude ASAs with
third countries (which practically means that the Member States have not
given up on their sovereignty in this area), it does have exclusive competence
whenever it has adopted internal rules relating to the treatment of
third-country nationals or has achieved complete harmonization in a certain
area.48 The latter is not the case in the area of external aviation relations.49
However, the former has materialized in certain areas, such as the pricing of
air services by third-country airlines when operating on intra-European routes
by virtue of their fifth freedom rights (where a prohibition of price leadership
applies).50 In such areas, the EU is solely competent and the Member States,
when negotiating ASAs, should cooperate closely with the EU institutions to
fulfil the requirement of unity in the international representation of the EU.51
In addition, the Court pronounced that whenever the EU has expressly
conferred on its institutions powers to negotiate with non-member countries, it
acquires exclusive competence.52
Following the ECJ’s rulings, the European Commission felt empowered to
request the Council to mandate it to negotiate comprehensive ASAs with third
countries on behalf of the Member States in order to best represent their (and
the EU’s) interests. Despite some reluctance, the Council agreed to individual
mandates (as opposed to a blanket mandate), provided that “the added value”
46. US-EU Air Transport Agreement (25 May 2007, O.J. 2007, L 134/4), amended by
Protocol of 25 March 2010 (O.J. 2010, L 223/3).
47. Case C-467/98, Commission v. Denmark; EU:C:2002:625; Case C-468/98,
Commission v. Sweden, EU:C:2002:626; Case C-469/98, Commission v. Finland,
EU:C:2002:627; Case C-471/98, Commission v. Belgium, EU:C:2002:628; Case C-472/98,
Commission v. Luxembourg, EU:C:2002:629; Case C-475/98, Commission v. Austria; Case
C-476/98, Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2002:631; Case C-466/98, Commission v. UK,
EU:C:2002:624.
48. See Case C-471/98, Commission v. Belgium, paras. 96 and 97.
49. See Art. 3 TFEU, which lists the areas where the EU has exclusive competence, and Art.
4 TFEU, which lists the areas where the EU and the Member States have shared competence.
One of these areas is transport. See also para 106 of Case C-471/98, Commission v. Belgium.
50. Art. 22(1) of Regulation (EC) 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 Sept. 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast),
O.J. 2008, L 293/3.
51. Regulation (EC) 847/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the negotiation and implementation of air services agreements between Member States
and third countries, O.J. 2004, L 157/7.
52. See para 96 of Case C-471//98, Commission v. Belgium.
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of any EU-level agreement is clearly demonstrated in each case.53 Within
these parameters, the Commission developed the agenda for the EU’s external
aviation policy.54 “Ensuring fair competition, i.e. promoting regulatory
convergence” in the context of agreements “no longer developed between
Member States and third countries, but rather between the [EU] and those
countries” became part of the Commission’s agenda.55
In 2012, the Commission reviewed the EU’s external aviation policy and did
not hesitate to point to specific countries whose policies might confer unfair
competitive advantages on their air carriers, in particular the Gulf States.56
Considering that the Gulf airlines qualify as sixth freedom air carriers, since
they carry traffic between two third countries through their hub airports, the
old debate about the legitimacy of such operations was revived, with the
Commission stating poignantly: “[R]elations with the Gulf States have in
recent years been a largely one-way process of opening EU markets for Gulf
carriers, which has created significant imbalances in opportunities”.57 The
Commission also expressed doubts about “whether the transparency in the
financial performance reporting of some Gulf carriers meets international
standards” and lamented the reluctance of some of the Gulf States “to accept
or even discuss ‘fair competition’ clauses with EU Member States
individually”, calling for coordination “at EU level through comprehensive
EU aviation agreements with key countries”.58
The growth of the Gulf airlines alarmed the legacy airlines, especially on
the other side of the Atlantic. In 2015, the “Partnership for Open & Fair
Skies”,59 a coalition composed chiefly of the US “Big 3” airlines, namely
Delta,AmericanAirlines and UnitedAirlines, issued a “White Paper” alleging
that the State-owned Gulf carriers, in particular Emirates, Etihad and Qatar
Airways, had relied on over $40 billion in subsidies and other unfair
government-conferred advantages in the last decade alone to fuel their
growth.60 The “Big 3” accused the Gulf airlines of using the subsidies to dump
53. Communication from the Commission on relations between the Community and third
countries in the field of air transport, COM(2003)94.
54. Commission Communication, Developing the agenda for the Community’s external
aviation policy, COM(2005)79 final, 11 March 2005.
55. Ibid., at I.2.
56. Commission Communication, The EU’s External Aviation Policy – Addressing future
challenges, COM(2012)556 final, 27 Sept. 2012, paras. 27 & 50.
57. Ibid., para 50.
58. Ibid.
59. For more information, visit: <www.openandfairskies.com/>.
60. See Delta Airlines, American Airlines and United Airlines, “Restoring Open Skies: The
need to address subsidized competition from State-owned airlines in Qatar and the UAE”, 28
Jan. 2015, at <www.openandfairskies.com/wp-content/themes/custom/media/White.Paper.
pdf>.
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capacity on international routes, boosting demand for air transport services
beyond global GDP growth and, thereafter, filling up excess capacity by
hoovering up other carriers’ passengers. They pointed out that the expansion
of the Gulf carriers to international routes, in particular to routes to the US,
had been facilitated by the 2002 US-United Arab Emirates (UAE)61 and the
2001 US-Qatar62 open skies agreements, and stressed that US airlines are not
able to make the most of the liberal provisions in the open skies agreements, in
view of the low level of demand for travel originating in or destined for the
Gulf States, which disables them from mounting, besides fifth and sixth
freedom flights, even typical return (i.e. third and fourth freedom) flights.
Furthermore, they underlined that if US airlines lose international traffic to
the Gulf airlines, they will have to curtail their domestic hub-and-spoke
operations, scaling down smaller communities’ connection to the main hubs.
For all these reasons, the “Big 3” called for an agreement “on measures to
address the flow of subsidized Gulf carrier capacity to the United States”.63
The orchestrated campaign against the Gulf carriers by the “Big 3” and the
intense lobbying of the US government has not garnered the anticipated
political support. In a recent meeting between President Trump and
representatives of the “Big 3”, the latter were asked to file a formal complaint
with the US Department of Transportation under the IATFCPA in order for
their case to be considered.64 This is precisely what the “US Airlines for Open
Skies”, a coalition of US airlines in support of US open skies agreements
(joined by organizations representing the US travel, tourism and hospitality
industries, as well as local communities),65 have consistently maintained in
their letters to the US government.66
To date, no complaint has been filed by the US carriers. Whether such
inaction may point to the (in)validity of their claims or to pure awareness that
the IATFCPA is a unilateral domestic measure that feeds into issues regulated
bilaterally between sovereign States and, as such, it is used by the US
administration strategically to address the proper implementation of the
relevant international agreement, rather than as a nuclear weapon to disrupt,
besides diplomatic relations, connectivity between the two countries, is hard
61. Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Arab Emirates, signed on 2 March 2002, at <2009-2017.state
.gov/documents/organization/125743.pdf>.
62. Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Qatar, signed on 3 Oct. 2001, at <2009-2017.state.gov/documents
/organization/114398.pdf>.
63. “White Paper”, cited supra note 60.
64. Regarding IATFCPA complaints, visit <www.transportation.gov/policy/aviation-poli
cy/iatfcpa-complaints>.
65. For more information, visit <openskiescoalition.com/>.
66. All letters and other filings are available at <openskiescoalition.com/filings/>.
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to assess.67 In any event, the fracas caused by the US “Big 3” triggered
discussions between the US and Qatar, which culminated in a set of
“understandings” or “political commitments” that “airlines should issue
public annual reports with financial statements audited externally in
accordance with internationally-recognized accounting standards” and
“publicly disclose significant new transactions with state-owned enterprises
and take steps to ensure that such transactions are based on commercial
terms”.68 A similar “understanding” was reached with the UAE.69
Even though the campaign against the Gulf carriers has not produced
spectacular results in the area of regulatory convergence, it has unequivocally
placed the issue of fair competition in international air transport on the agenda
of EU policymakers. In 2016, the European Commission was authorized by
the Council to negotiate EU-level aviation agreements with the UAE and
Qatar. The EU-Qatar negotiations resulted in the Parties initialling a
comprehensive air transport agreement in March 2019. Key features of this
agreement are “provisions on fair competition with strong enforcement
mechanisms to avoid distortions of competition and abuses negatively
affecting the operations of EU airlines in the EU or in third countries” and
“transparency provisions in line with international reporting and accounting
standards to ensure obligations are fully respected”.70
Aeropolitics seems to have played a role in the conclusion of this
agreement. Arguably, the air blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
Bahrain and Egypt, effective since 2017, catalysed the conclusion of the
agreement. In its press release, QatarAirways stated that “through this historic
agreement…the State of Qatar has demonstrated once again that despite the
ongoing intra-regional geopolitical tensions due to the illegal blockade
67. See critical analysis in Havel, who argues that “it is a peculiarity of the
IATCA/IATFCPA investigation process . . . that the U.S. Government provides a forum for a
private air carrier directly to challenge the sovereign action of a foreign government under an
agreement that confers ‘bilateral rights’ on the U.S. Government”, op. cit. supra note 33, Ch. 4
III D.
68. Media Note: Understandings with Qatar Seek Level Playing Field, Office of the
Spokesperson, 30 Jan. 2018, at <www.state.gov/understandings-with-qatar-seek-level-playing
-field/>.
69. Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the United States-United Arab Emirates
Open Skies Understanding, 17 May 2018, at <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
statement-press-secretary-regarding-united-states-united-arab-emirates-open-skies-understan
ding/>.
70. European Commission Press Release IP/19/1490, EU and Qatar reach aviation
agreement, 4 March 2019.
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imposed on the nation, it remains a leader on the global stage”.71 Having said
that, the agreement is not isolated from Qatar’s external aviation policy, which
seems to encourage openness and cooperation. Qatar Airways is the only Gulf
airline that has joined a global airline alliance (i.e. oneworld) and that has
acquired significant equity stakes in fellow airlines. Recently, Qatar Airways
and American Airlines resumed their codeshare agreement (which was
suspended in 2017 due to the allegations about illegal subsidization),
bolstering Qatar’s quest for cooperation and synergies.72
Unlike Qatar, the UAE refused to enter into negotiations with the EU to
reach a comprehensive air transport agreement, contending that the European
Commission’s draft text proposal lacked ambition and pointing out that a
potential open skies agreement would need to “provide for full and immediate
liberalization going beyond what already exists – specifically including full
and immediate liberalization of third, fourth, and fifth-freedom traffic
rights.”73 The UAE has concluded bilateral ASAs with most of the EU
Member States, safeguarding in some cases fifth freedom rights. Such
agreements, in synergy with the 2002 US-UAE open skies agreement, which
is also permissive of fifth freedom rights, legitimize Emirates’ operations
from Dubai to New York JFK via Milan, Italy, and from Dubai to Newark via
Athens, Greece, which have been a bone of contention for US airlines.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the UAE saw no added value in accepting
the EU’s terms on an array of issues, including fair competition, without, at the
same time, being offered more market access. This is even more so
considering the hostile climate that the UAE airlines, i.e. Emirates and Etihad,
have often faced when exercising their traffic rights or investing in EU
airlines.
Fifth freedom rights seem also to have been a bone of contention in the case
of Brazil. The EU initialled a comprehensive air transport agreement with
Brazil in 2011, which would “ensure a level playing field for fair competition
between EU and Brazilian airlines”.74 However, the signing of the Agreement
was postponed twice and in 2017 Brazil expressed its lack of interest in the
71. Qatar Airways Press Release of 5 Feb. 2019, Qatar and the European Union Conclude
Negotiations on Landmark Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement, at <www.qatarairways.
com/en/press-releases/2019/February0/qatar-and-the-european-union-conclude-negotiations-
on-landmark-c.html>.
72. Qatar Airways Press Release of 25 Feb. 2020, Qatar Airways and American Airlines
Sign Strategic Partnership Deal and Codeshare Agreement, at <https://www.qatarairways.com
/en/press-releases/2020/February/QRAACodeshare.html?activeTag=Press-releases>.
73. Buyck, “UAE Rebuffs Open Skies Talks With the EU”, AINonline, 16 Jan. 2019, at
<www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2019-01-16/uae-rebuffs-open-skies-talks-eu>.
74. European Commission Press Release IP/11/327, Breakthrough in EU-Brazil
negotiations on far-reaching aviation agreement, 18 March 2011.
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negotiations due to the EU’s refusal to grant fifth freedom traffic rights,
despite championing fair competition.75 The EU paused the negotiations in
March 2018, following which Brazil concluded bilateral open skies
agreements with the UK, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, reserving fifth
freedom rights for Brazilian airlines.76 Interestingly, in 2011 Brazil signed an
open skies agreement with the US, which was eventually ratified in 2018,
providing for the full liberalization of fifth freedom rights.77
The EU is currently negotiating an inter-regional agreement with the
Association of South East Asian Nations, which, when concluded, will be the
first block-to-block agreement of its kind.78 Reportedly, fifth freedom rights
have once again been a sticking point between the two sides.79
In the following section, two recent EU policies to promote fair competition
in international air transport will be examined with a view to assessing the
efficiency of the EU strategy in that area.
3. EU policies to safeguard fair competition in international air
transport
3.1. Regulation (EU) 2019/712, repealing Regulation (EC) 868/2004
As already mentioned, the basket of measures adopted by the US to address
the repercussions of 9/11 for US airlines triggered a legislative response from
the EU, namely Regulation 868/2004.80 The objective of the Regulation was to
protect EU airlines against the subsidization of third-country airlines and
unfair pricing practices adopted by the latter when operating on routes to and
from the EU.81 Therefore, the scope of the Regulation was limited to subsidies
75. Boadle, “Brazil plans to end Open Skies negotiation with EU”, Reuters, 21 Dec. 2017,
at <www.reuters.com/article/brazil-aviation-eu/brazil-plans-to-end-open-skies-negotiation-
with-eu-idUSL1N1OK1MM>.
76. Buyck, “Brazil Pushes Bilateral Open Skies Deals with EU Countries”, AINonline, 15
Aug. 2018, at <www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2018-08-15/brazil-pushes-
bilateral-open-skies-deals-eu-countries>.
77. TIAS 18-0521, Agreement between the USA and Brazil, signed at Brasilia, 19 March
2011; entered into force 21 May 2018; Art. 2(1).
78. Hololei, Keynote Speech, InternationalAviation Club, Washington DC, 23 July 2019, at
<ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/2019-07-23-international-aviation-club-dc.pdf>.
79. Meszaros, “Asean-EU Air Transport Deal Near Completion”, AINonline, 6 Dec. 2018,
at <www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2018-12-06/asean-eu-air-transport-deal-
near-completion>.
80. Regulation (EC) 868/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April
2004 concerning protection against subsidization and unfair pricing practices causing injury to
Community air carriers in the supply of air services from countries not members of the
European Community, O.J. 2004, L 162/1.
81. Ibid., Arts. 1 and 2 of the Regulation.
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and unfair pricing practices rather than to any measure or practice that might
distort competition. For an action to be brought successfully, it was necessary
that injury be caused to the “Community industry”, i.e. the totality of the EU
airlines competing on the contentious routes or at least the ones holding a
majority share on those routes.82 The determination of injury was based on
positive evidence concerning in particular the level of fares on the relevant
city-pairs and their impact on EU airlines or the existence of countervailable
subsidies.83
In the fifteen years that the Regulation was in force, i.e. from 2004 until
2019, when it was eventually repealed, it was never applied. The reasons for its
ineffectiveness are well-documented84 and have been acknowledged by the
EU institutions themselves.85 Most crucially, proving “unfair pricing
practices” is no easy task since airlines rely on sophisticated yield
management systems to determine their pricing practices, which are also
proprietary and commercially sensitive.86 Equally, proving the existence of
“countervailable subsidies” is virtually impossible in the case of State-owned
and controlled airlines. The high evidential burden was also due to the airlines
having to adduce evidence of the existence of unfair pricing practices or
subsidies, injury, and a causal link between the unfair pricing practice or
subsidy and the injury.87 Locus standi was also an issue since actions could
only be brought by the “Community industry”, as opposed to individual EU
airlines or even Member States.88 The Commission first announced its
intention to develop “a more appropriate and effective instrument . . . to
safeguard fair and open competition in the EU’s external aviation relations” in
2012.89 A proposal for a Regulation on safeguarding competition in air
transport was issued in 2017 and Regulation 868/2004 was finally repealed
82. Ibid., Arts. 3(b) and 3(d).
83. Ibid., Arts. 6 and 7.
84. See MCGonigle, op. cit. supra note 45.
85. Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – An Aviation Strategy for Europe,
SWD(2015)261 final, 7 Dec. 2015. See also, Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on safeguarding competition in air transport, repealing
Regulation (EC) 868/2004, COM(2017)289 final, 8 June 2019.
86. McGonigle, “Fair competition, subsidy, and State aid clauses in international air
services agreements”, 37 Annals Air & Space Law (2012), 199–222.
87. Art. 7(1), Regulation 868/2004, cited supra note 80.
88. Ibid., Art. 7(1).
89. Commission Communication cited supra note 56, para 26.
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and replaced by Regulation 2019/712, which entered into force on 30 May
2019.90
The new Regulation addresses the chief deficiencies of its predecessor.
Specifically, its scope is wider, as shown by its title, which refers to
“safeguarding competition in air transport” as opposed to “protection against
subsidization and unfair pricing practices”. Thus, the new Regulation covers
“practices distorting competition”, meaning “discrimination and subsidies”.91
Discrimination is defined as “differentiation of any kind without objective
justification in respect of the supply of goods or services” in areas such as
public services, air navigation, airport facilities and services, fuel, ground
handling, security, computer reservation systems, slot allocation, and
charges.92 The widening of the scope of the Regulation entails the expansion
of its geographical coverage. Thus, whilst under the old Regulation unfair
pricing practices had to be established on routes to or from the EU, under the
new Regulation “practices distorting competition” are examined not only in
the context of city-pair routes, but also for their effects on “the wider air
transport network”.93 Moreover, locus standi is now also granted to individual
airlines, as well as Member States.94 The evidential burden has been lightened
in that complaints can now be brought when there is “prima facie evidence of
a threat of injury” (rather than evidence of injury).95 Consequently, the
Commission’s investigative powers have been heightened and it is now able to
carry out investigations in third countries, albeit subject to the consent of the
third-country entity concerned and in the absence of an objection by the third
country.96
Although Regulation 868/2004 was never applied, its effectiveness has also
been questioned in the light of the available redressive measures, namely
“duties” upon the third-country airlines concerned,97 a remedy developed for
trade in goods rather than services.98 Regulation 2019/712 expands the types
of redressive measures, providing, next to “financial duties”, for “any
operational measure of equivalent or lesser value, such as the suspension of
concessions, of services owed or of other rights of the third-country air
90. Regulation (EU) 2019/712 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2019 on safeguarding competition in air transport, and repealing Regulation (EC) 868/2004,
O.J. 2019, L 123/4.
91. Ibid., Art. 1(1), in conjunction with Art. 2(6).
92. Ibid., Art. 2(8), in conjunction with Recital 10.
93. Ibid., Recital 15.
94. Ibid., Art. 4(1), in conjunction with Recital 13.
95. Ibid., Art. 4(1), in conjunction with Recital 14.
96. Ibid., Art. 5(8), in conjunction with Recital 16.
97. Art. 9 of Regulation (EC) 868/2004, cited supra note 80.
98. Commission Staff Working Document, cited supra note 85.
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carrier”.99 Most importantly, it rules out redressive measures that consist of
the “suspension or limitation of traffic rights which are granted by a Member
State to a third country”.100 By the same token, if the EU has entered into an air
transport-related agreement with a third country, the Commission may
suspend the investigation if it appears more appropriate to address the issue
“exclusively under the dispute settlement procedures” established by the
relevant agreement.101 It may also terminate the investigation if it concludes
that adopting redressive measures would be against the Union interest.102 The
preference of the EU for political rather than legal solutions is also evident in
the right afforded to EU Member States to address a practice distorting
competition exclusively under the dispute settlement procedures applicable
under their bilateral agreements with the third-country concerned.103
Arguably, the effectiveness of the new Regulation will be determined, first,
by its ability to attract legitimate claims and, second, by its ability to address
them fairly and expeditiously. By and large, the expanded scope of the
Regulation, the new provisions on standing, and the lower evidential burden
on claimants, in conjunction with the benchmark of Union interest (which is
also reflected in the provision that redressive measures shall not enter into
force before the threat of injury has developed into actual injury),104 welcome
legitimate claims.
Whether the new Regulation will prove effective in redressing fair
competition is harder to assess. For example, it is an issue whether it is apt to
redress “covert” types of discrimination, such as unduly burdensome
administrative procedures (e.g. in the allocation of visas for the air carrier’s
staff, in customs clearance, or even in the issue of permits). Quantifying and
monetizing the impact of such measures and proving injury as a result, in order
for financial duties or operational measures of equivalent effect to be imposed,
requires, besides sophisticated economic analysis, the production of evidence.
Even though the Regulation empowers the Commission to carry out in situ
inspections in foreign jurisdictions, these cannot be unannounced. In addition,
whilst the Commission is entitled to make “provisional or final findings,
affirmative or negative” on the basis of the facts and evidence available, where
access to the necessary information is refused or delayed, or where the
99. Art. 14(3) in conjunction with Recital 24 of Regulation EU 2019/712, cited supra note
90.
100. Ibid., Recital 27.
101. Ibid., Art. 6, in conjunction with Recital 17.
102. Ibid., Art. 13(2) (b), in conjunction with Art. 3.
103. Ibid., Art. 6(2).
104. Ibid., Art. 14(2).
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investigation is significantly impeded,105 it is unlikely that it will jump to
politically sensitive conclusions in the absence of robust evidence.106
The most important innovation of Regulation 2019/712 is that it regulates
its interface with: i) the ASAs concluded by Member States with third
countries; and ii) the ASAs (or air transport agreements or any other
agreement which contains provisions on air transport services) to which the
Union is a party. Thus, unlike Regulation 868/2004, which gave priority to
ASAs concluded by Member States with third countries,107 the new
Regulation takes a more nuanced approach in that, even though the Preamble
declares that “[F]air competition between air carriers should preferably be
addressed in the context of air transport or air services agreements with third
countries”,108 the operative part gives priority to the Commission, unless the
Member States concerned notify the Commission of their intention to address
the issue in the context of their ASAs.109 Moreover, unlike Regulation
868/2004, whose objective was not to “preclude the application of any special
provisions in agreements between the Community and countries not members
of the European Community”,110 the new Regulation gives the Commission
discretion to either conduct an investigation under the Regulation or to address
the issue in the context of its international agreement with the third country
concerned.111
Comprehending the complementarity between the Regulation and the
relevant ASAs is critical in order to assess the efficiency of the EU strategy on
fair competition in international air transport. The next section examines the
operation of fair competition clauses in ASAs with a view to determining
whether the new Regulation and such clauses are synergistic or mutually
exclusive.
3.2. Fair competition clauses in air services agreements
In 1946, the US and the UK entered into an ASA, whose text became the
blueprint for future bilateral ASAs. This agreement, named after Bermuda,
where it was signed, laid down a number of principles to regulate capacity. The
105. Ibid., Art. 9.
106. Goeteyn and Killick, “The new regulation on safeguarding competition in air
transport: An effective enforcement tool?”, Expert Guides, 17 May 2019, at <www.
expertguides.com/articles/the-new-regulation-on-safeguarding-competition-in-air-transport-
an-effective-enforcement-tool/arhgfncw>.
107. Art. 1, in conjunction with Recital 5, Regulation 868/2004 cited supra note 80.
108. Recital 7, Regulation 2019/712 cited supra note 90.
109. Ibid., Art. 6(2), in conjunction with Recital 18.
110. Art. 1(3), Regulation 868/2004 cited supra note 80.
111. Art. 6, in conjunction with Recital 17, Regulation 2019/712 cited supra note 90.
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first principle provided that “there shall be a fair and equal opportunity for the
carriers of the two nations to operate on any route between their respective
territories (as defined in the Agreement) covered by the Agreement and its
Annex”.112 This principle, which affords the airlines the freedom to operate
services at the frequency/capacity they consider justified, is qualified by the
principles that: (i) air carriers operating on trunk routes shall take into
consideration the interests of their foreign “competitors” so as not to unduly
affect their services on the same routes; (ii) the primary objective of air
services is the provision of capacity adequate for the traffic demands between
third and fourth freedom markets; and (iii) fifth freedom operations shall be
offered at the capacity required by traffic demand especially between third and
fourth freedom markets, after taking account of local and regional services in
the “through” (i.e. connection) market.113
The freedom afforded to airlines to operate within the parameters of the
Bermuda capacity principles amounts to their “fair and equal
opportunity . . . to operate”. Such a wording reflects the objective set by
Article 44(f) of the Chicago Convention to “insure . . . that every contracting
State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines”.114 Even though
the content of Bermuda’s primordial fair competition clause is unlike today’s
concept of fair competition, it provided for a system of controlled
competition, whereby capacity was not predetermined and allocated ex ante,
but related to traffic needs, taking into consideration both the public’s
requirements for air services and the requirements of both trunk-line
operations and local or regional operations.115 Similar clauses were replicated
in Bermuda-type ASAs and were usually part and parcel of the relevant
provisions regulating capacity.116
Bermuda was denounced in 1976 by the UK, which considered that the
capacity principles, and especially the relaxed approach towards fifth freedom
operations, benefited the US airlines at the expense of UK carriers.117
112. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom Relating to Air Services between their respective
territories, 11 Feb. 1946, US-UK; 60 Stat. 1499, Sections 4–6 of the Final Act.
113. For analysis of the Bermuda capacity principles, see Diamond, “The Bermuda
Agreement revisited: A look at the past, present and future of bilateral air transport
agreements”, 41 Journal of Air Law & Commerce (1975), 419–496.
114. Chicago Convention, cited supra note 1.
115. Diamond, op. cit. supra note 113.
116. See e.g. Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and
the Austrian Federal Government relating to Air Services, 22 March 1967, Australian Treaty
Series 1967 No. 10, Art. 8, entitled “Capacity regulations”, at <www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/
dfat/treaties/1967/10.html>.
117. Hill, “Bermuda II: The British Revolution of 1976”, 44 Journal of Air Law &
Commerce (1978), 111–129.
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Bermuda II of 1977, a diplomatic success of the UK, curtailed the US’s fifth
freedom rights and limited the number of US carriers serving London.
Paradoxically, in the Preamble to the Agreement, the Parties “resolved to
provide fair and equal opportunity for their designated airlines to compete in
the provision of international air services” and regulated capacity in an Article
entitled “Fair Competition”, whereby “the designated . . . airlines . . . shall
have a fair and equal opportunity to compete…”.118 Even though the evolution
in the wording between Bermuda I and Bermuda II from “a fair and equal
opportunity to operate” to “a fair and equal opportunity to compete”
respectively was not representative of any opening up of the bilateral markets
to competition, it underscored the significance of fair competition in
international air transport, as well as the different perceptions of States as to
the concept of fair competition.
By the year 1992, when the US launched its open skies policy, fair
competition reflected the desire “to promote an international aviation system
based on competition among airlines in the marketplace with minimum
government interference and regulation”.119 The shift of power from national
governments to airlines extended not only to the frequency and capacity of
international air transportation, but also to pricing. Airlines were thus free to
determine these factors “based upon commercial considerations in the
marketplace”.120 Even though the wording of the fair competition clause has
not evolved since Bermuda II (i.e. “a fair and equal opportunity for the
designated airlines to compete”),121 its content has expanded to cover
increased market access, i.e. unlimited fifth freedom rights, and free pricing,
subject only to the competition law objectives of preventing “unreasonably
discriminatory prices or practices”, protecting “consumers from prices that
are unreasonably high or restrictive due to the abuse of a dominant position”,
and protecting “airlines from prices that are artificially low due to direct or
indirect governmental subsidy or support”.122
118. See Art. 11 of the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America Concerning
Air Services, 23 July 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367.
119. See e.g. the Preamble to the US-Switzerland Air Transport Agreement of 15 June
1995, at <2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/114329.pdf>.
120. Ibid., Art. 11.
121. However, the Parties’ desire in the Preamble to open skies agreements “to promote an
international aviation system based on competition among airlines in the marketplace with
minimum government interference and regulation” was substituted for the Parties’ resolution in
the Preamble to Bermuda II “to provide fair and equal opportunity for their designated airlines
to compete in the provision of international air services”, US-Switzerland Agreement cited
supra note 119, Art. 11 and Preamble.
122. Ibid., Art. 12.
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Until the second generation of open skies agreements, the issue of subsidies
as an element that may affect fair competition had not been raised or a fortiori
regulated in ASAs. Nor did the US definition of open skies – or indeed the US
Model Open Skies Agreement123 – refer to subsidies. The need to control
subsidies was first raised in the second generation of open skies agreements in
the context of pricing.124 The 2007 US-EU Air Transport Agreement further
expanded the scope of fair competition in international air transportation,
addressing subsidies as a separate issue rather than as a function of pricing.
Thus, already, in the Preamble to the Agreement, the Parties expressed their
desire “to promote an international aviation system based on competition
among airlines in the marketplace with minimum government interference
and regulation” and recognized “that government subsidies may adversely
affect airline competition”.125 The importance the Parties attached to fair
competition is illustrated by their choice to have an autonomous fair
competition clause in Article 2 (following the “definitions” clause in Art. 1),
reading: “Each Party shall allow a fair and equal opportunity for the airlines of
both Parties to compete in providing the international air transportation
governed by this Agreement”. These principles were enunciated in Article 14
on government subsidies and support and Article 20 on competition.
Unlike the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which offers
a descriptive definition of State aid126 that has been interpreted extensively by
the European Courts and applied by the European Commission and the EU
Member States in myriads of cases since the late 1950s,127 the US-EU Air
TransportAgreement does not define a subsidy, but refers non-exhaustively to
examples thereof, “including capital injections, cross-subsidization, grants,
guarantees, ownership, relief or tax exemption, by any governmental
entities”.128 The sensitivity of the issue can be sensed in the Memorandum of
Consultations accompanying the Agreement, whereby while the EU pointed
out that the TFEU “does not prejudice in any way the rules in Member States
governing the system of property ownership”, the US responded that
“government ownership of an airline may adversely affect the fair and equal
123. Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of [Country], 12 Jan. 2012, at <www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/114866.
htm>.
124. See e.g. Art. 12 of US-France Air Transport Agreement of 18 June 1998, at
<2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/114271.pdf>.
125. US-EU Agreement cited supra note 46.
126. Art. 107(1) TFEU reads: “… any aid granted by a Member State or through State
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market”.
127. See Case 30/59, Steenkolenmijnen v. High Authority, EU:C:1961:2.
128. Art. 14(4), US-EU Agreement cited supra note 46.
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opportunity of airlines to compete in providing the international air
transportation governed by this Agreement”.129 It is perhaps for this reason
that the parties devised a mechanism of consultation to resolve relevant
issues130 before resorting to arbitration131 or terminating the Agreement.132
In the areas of antitrust and abuse of dominance, the Parties “affirmed that
their respective competition regimes are applied in a manner to respect the fair
and equal opportunity to compete accorded to all airlines of the Parties, and in
accordance with the general principle of protecting and enhancing
competition in markets as a whole, notwithstanding possible contrary interests
of individual airline competitors”.133 The ultimate objective of the Agreement
is regulatory convergence (including) in the area of competition134 and the
means to achieve it is close cooperation between the parties’ competition
authorities.135 In stark contrast to subsidies (and indeed any other issue that
may arise under the Agreement), competition-related disputes may not be
submitted to arbitration.136 Unless a solution can be reached by the parties’
Joint Committee,137 it seems that the only path available is terminating the
Agreement. It is unclear whether the right to “revoke, suspend or limit the
operating authorizations or technical permissions or otherwise suspend or
limit the operations of an airline” may be exercised in the event of alleged
violations of competition law.138 The preference for consultations and
negotiated solutions is in line with the spirit of the Agreement for regulatory
convergence.
The EU reached a similar comprehensive air transport agreement with
Canada in 2009, based on the same principles of fair competition.139 Unlike
the US-EU Agreement, which regulated State subsidies and competition
separately, the Canada-EU Agreement tackled both issues jointly, laying the
emphasis however on subsidies.140 The parties recognized “that fair
competitive practices by airlines are most likely to occur where these airlines
129. Ibid., para 34.
130. Ibid., Art. 14(2) and (3), in conjunction with Art. 18(4) (d), as amended by Art. 5(4)(c)
of 2010 Protocol.
131. Ibid., Art. 19.
132. Ibid., Art. 23.
133. Ibid., see Art. 20(1), in conjunction with Art. 3, and paras. 44–45 of the Memorandum
of Consultations.
134. Ibid., Art. 20(2), in conjunction with Art. 2 of Annex 2.
135. Ibid., Art. 20(3), in conjunction with Annex 2.
136. Ibid., Art. 19(1).
137. Ibid., Art. 18(2).
138. Ibid., Art. 5(c), in conjunction with Art. 7(1).
139. The 2009 Canada-EU Air Transport Agreement is available at <ec.europa.eu/transport
/sites/transport/files/modes/air/international_aviation/country_index/doc/canada_final_text_
agreement.pdf>.
140. Ibid., Art. 14.
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operate on a fully commercial basis and are not State subsidized” and “the
conditions under which airlines are privatized, the removal of competition
distorting subsidies, equitable and non-discriminatory access to airport
facilities and services and to computer reservation systems are key factors to
achieve a fair and competitive environment”.141 An innovative feature of the
Agreement is the strong enforcement mechanisms that have been provided,
which entitle the parties to revoke the operating authorization of an airline of
the other party where it has been determined that conditions in the territory of
the other party are not consistent with a fair and competitive environment and
are resulting in a significant disadvantage or harm to their airlines.142
However, such action “shall be appropriate, proportionate and restricted with
regard to scope and duration to what is strictly necessary”, “it shall be
exclusively directed towards the entity benefiting from the [anticompetitive]
conditions” and it shall be without prejudice to the right of any party to seek
dispute settlement through formal consultations, mediation or arbitration.143
Having examined both Regulation 2019/712 and the fair competition
clauses in the ASAs, the next section turns to the question of whether
unilateral action under the Regulation could defeat the purpose of the fair
competition provisions in ASAs, alienating the EU and its Member States
from its partners, or whether the Regulation merely reinforces the
effectiveness of the fair competition clauses in ASAs.
4. Assessing the efficiency of the EU strategy in the area of fair
competition in international air transportation
Assessing the efficiency of the EU strategy to safeguard fair competition in
international air transport is challenging, not least because of the array of EU
policies that feed into competition beyond the EU competition and State aid
regime, such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the EU external
aviation policy and even Regulation 261/2004 on air passenger rights.
Arguably, the allegations against the Gulf airlines triggered the EU finally to
repeal Regulation 868/2004 and replace it with a new instrument that feeds
directly into commitments and obligations undertaken internationally under
ASAs. The question which arises is whether unilateral action under
Regulation 2019/712 is compatible with commitments undertaken either
bilaterally or multilaterally under the ASAs or whether it defies international
141. Ibid., Art. 14(1).
142. Ibid., Art. 3(3).
143. Ibid., Art. 14(5).
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commitments, estranging the EU from its partners and even harming the EU
Member States’ interests.
To answer this question, one needs to consider, first, the legitimacy of the
relevant EU policies and, second, the legitimacy of the EU itself to impose
such policies at the international level. Looking first at the issue of subsidies,
the EU has pioneered a system of strict State aid control, whereby the types of
aid and the conditions under which national governments can grant such aid to
their airline and airport industry are clearly defined in transparent and readily
accessible instruments.144 Moreover, prevention and deterrent mechanisms,
such as the notification and the stand-still obligation,145 and the obligation to
recover illegal aid with interest,146 are activated to ensure the effectiveness of
the EU State aid regime, which is ultimately supervised by the EU courts. The
gradual tightening of the rules along with airline and airport liberalization and
privatization, and the respective tightening of the European Commission’s
enforcement powers, have resulted in several EU airlines, such as Sabena,
Olympic Airways, Malév, Cyprus Airways, and Air Berlin exiting the market.
Therefore, the EU appears to have the moral weight to demand that
third-country jurisdictions subject their airline and airport industry to equally
strict rules.
In the area of competition, the EU has pioneered regulatory convergence, a
goal that in air transport has been promoted through the EU’s external aviation
policy. Comprehensive air transport agreements, such as the agreement with
the US and Canada, are explicit about the overarching objective of regulatory
convergence and set mechanisms of regular meetings of the Parties’ Joint
Committee in place, to promote such an objective through consultations and
the exchange of best practice. The creation of a Common Aviation Area with
the EU’s neighbouring countries, whereby the latter obtain access to the EU
single aviation market in exchange for complying with EU laws, including
competition law, is another pillar of the EU’s external aviation policy.147 Even
though the EU’s strategy to promote its own agenda, including its laws, may
create suspicion and disbelief, the EU is transparent about its objectives. All
policy documents are published on its website and are easily accessible to the
general public. Therefore, the EU does not appear to have a hidden agenda or
to promote objectives that are not in the public interest. Most crucially, the
legitimacy of the EU to promote regulatory convergence in very many areas,
including competition, stems from its strictness towards first and foremost its
144. See especially Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid to
airports and airlines, O.J. 2014, C 99/3.
145. Art. 108(3) TFEU.
146. Commission Notice on the recovery of unlawful and incompatible State aid, O.J. 2019,
C 247/1.
147. Commission Communication cited supra note 56.
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own airlines. In fact, the latter have been vocal in stating that certain EU
policies inflict harm on the EU airline industry in the name of an unrealistic
view of global competition. The EU ETS, Regulation 261/2004 on air
passenger rights, the EU State aid regime, and night curfews at EU airports are
typical examples of such policies.
Looking more specifically at whether Regulation 2019/712 is in conflict
with ASAs in that it provides for unilateral action, whereas ASAs provide for
mutually agreed actions through dialogue and consultations, one notices that
unilateral action under the Regulation is frozen when the enforcement
mechanisms under the ASAs are triggered. Even though the Regulation
signals a shift of power from the Member States to the EU, it does not trespass
on the Member States’ competence in the area of concluding ASAs with third
countries. First, the EU can only negotiateASAs with third countries on behalf
of its Member States if mandated by the latter. Second, when the issue of fair
competition is raised in the context of bilateral ASAs with third countries, EU
Member States retain their power to block the Commission’s unilateral action
under the Regulation in order “to address the practice distorting competition
exclusively under the dispute settlement procedures contained in their
respective air transport or ASAs or any other agreement which contains
provisions on air transport services concluded with a third party”, albeit
provided that all the Member States concerned agree to that.148 Even though
the Commission retains its power to resume an investigation where a practice
distorting competition persists,149 the Regulation is adamant that the
redressive measures under the Regulation “shall not lead the Union or the
Member States concerned to violate air transport or ASAs or any provision on
air transport services included in a trade agreement or any other agreement
concluded with the third country concerned”.150
In the event that the Union is a party to an ASA concluded with a third
country, the Regulation gives the Commission the discretion to decide
whether to address a practice distorting competition under the Regulation or
under the dispute settlement procedure established by the Agreement.151
However, the proviso that redressive measures under the Regulation shall not
violate the relevant international agreement applies. Therefore, it appears that
the EU Regulation and fair competition clauses in ASAs are interlocking
rather than incompatible. Arguably, the Regulation reinforces compliance
with commitments undertaken under the ASAs and, in the event of default,
148. Recital 18, in conjunction with Art. 6 of Regulation (EU) 2019/712, cited supra note
90.
149. Ibid., Recital 18.
150. Ibid., Art. 14(6).
151. Ibid., Recital 17, in conjunction with Art. 6.
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with the relevant enforcement mechanisms and redressive measures
thereunder.
Questioning the legitimacy of the EU Regulation and the Commission’s
action thereunder may be pre-empted by the very fact that the EU may draw
such legitimacy from the ASAs themselves. For example, the 2009
Canada-EU comprehensive air transport agreement explicitly authorizes the
Parties to take unilateral action to address anti-competitive practices without
first having to exhaust or even trigger the Agreement’s enforcement
mechanisms.152 Such action includes the right to revoke an airline’s operating
permission or authorization in the event that it benefits from anticompetitive
conditions in the territory of the other Party. The limits of such a right are set
by the Regulation itself, which rules out “any suspension or limitation of
traffic rights which are granted by a Member State to a third country”.153
Last but not least, Regulation 2019/712 is not an EU innovation. The US
IATFCPA has co-existed with ASAs since 1975. Even though it is beyond the
scope of this paper to compare the two instruments, they both constitute
unilateral domestic measures that address issues regulated bilaterally (or
multilaterally) by means of international agreements. They were both adopted
pursuant to complaints by national airlines about unfair competition in foreign
markets and, in spite of the mantle of fair competition, they are protective of
national airlines. The tension between championing fair competition on the
one hand and taking unilateral measures to protect national airlines on the
other hand, is a by-product of the regulation of international air transport along
the lines of ASAs. Whilst there is a patronizing connotation in unilateral
measures to counter “anti-competitive” actions of foreign States (and their
airlines), since they presuppose prior assessment from a position of
superiority, such measures can be used as a tool to achieve compliance with
ASAs, when the latter lack enforcement mechanisms, besides the nuclear
weapon of denunciation.
Using the IATFCPA complaint and investigation procedure as a benchmark
to assess the EU measures, it is interesting to note that even though the US
Senate has defended the legitimacy of unilateral countermeasures on the
grounds that they would be permissible under general international law
principles of retorsion (i.e. self-defence), even if they would, in themselves,
comprise a breach of the bilateral ASA, in practice the US has refrained from
either suspending a foreign carrier permit or denouncing an ASA. Instead, it
has used the IATFCPA procedure to address the issue with bilateral partners
and resolve it amicably.154 The EU Regulation presents the advantage of time
152. Art. 14(5), Canada-EU Agreement cited supra note 139.
153. Recital 27, Regulation 2019/712 cited supra note 90.
154. Havel, op. cit. supra note 33.
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in that, postdating the US Act by 45 years, in an era when fair competition
clauses are becoming prominent in open skies agreements, it enables the EU
to ventilate fair competition concerns and stage the debate about a level
playing field in international air transport.
Arguably, the “Brussels effect” of the EU measures – i.e. their ability to
achieve de facto and de jure regulatory globalization by obliging third-country
airlines to comply with EU standards when serving the EU market as a
condition of market access and, thereafter, lobbying their governments to
adopt the same standards domestically so as to ensure that competition against
domestic air carriers be on equal terms – stumbles upon the very regulation of
market access along the lines of bilateral (or multilateral) ASAs.155 To the
extent that the regulatory target is air services and such services are regulated
in ASAs, the EU has no power to introduce new standards or unilaterally raise
or lower the existing ones without the consent of its bilateral partners.
Moreover, even though the EU has the right to denounce an ASA to which it is
a party, if its standards are not complied with, this is a zero-sum proposition,
because connectivity between the relevant markets is going to be disrupted
altogether, since tit-for-tat retaliation usually extends also to third country
airlines and their right to serve the relevant markets by virtue of their fifth
freedom rights. Last, to the extent that fair competition in international air
transport depends (besides on typical competition and State aid law) also on
issues relevant to taxation, labour standards, passenger rights, environmental
standards, etc., unless such issues are covered under the ASAs or regulated
multilaterally at international level, the EU has no authority to challenge the
operation of foreign airlines in its jurisdiction on the grounds that it forces
stricter standards on its own airlines, or, for that matter, demand compliance
with EU standards.
Even though the “Brussels effect” of the examined EU measures may be
constrained by the rigidity of market access in international air transport, the
EU has been successful, first, in convincing its Member States to authorize the
European Commission to negotiate ASAs with third countries on their behalf,
and second, in progressively introducing into such ASAs parameters which
influence competition (e.g. social and environmental issues). The analysis
suggests that the new Regulation functions synergistically with fair
competition clauses in ASAs, creating a positive feedback loop that paves the
way for regulatory globalization.
155. Bradford, “The Brussels effect”, 107 Northwestern University Law Review (2012),
1–67.
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5. Conclusion
This paper examined the context within which recent allegations against the
Gulf airlines have been voiced and the EU’s response to the associated calls for
a level playing field in international air transport. The scope of the analysis
was limited to a couple of recent EU policies on fair competition, namely the
inclusion of fair competition clauses in ASAs and Regulation 2019/712. The
interplay between these policies was examined to determine their
complementary or conflicting nature and, ultimately, the wisdom of the EU
strategy in the area of fair competition in international air transport. It was
found that these policies are interlocking and mutually reinforcing. Even
though the efficiency of the EU strategy can only be assessed safely if all EU
policies that feed into fair competition in international air transport are
examined, the analysis suggests that the EU has now added to its toolbox two
powerful instruments to pursue its objectives. What is still to be seen is the
implementation of these instruments in practice and the determination of the
EU to exercise leadership in international aviation, a mission that can only be
fulfilled if it stands by the very principles that seem to permeate both the
Chicago Convention and EU law as a whole.
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